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Summary and Analysis  





This document is written to assist people living in rural areas to come to grips with  
the issues arising from the Traditional Courts Bill so that they are better able to 
participate in the legislative process. It compares the content of the current Bill with 
that proposed by the South African Law Commission in 2003. It also explains the 
connection between the Traditional Courts Bill and the 2003 Traditional Leadership 




The parliamentary process and the timeframe for the new law  
The Traditional Courts Bill was introduced to parliament in March 2008. In May 2008 
the Justice Portfolio Committee called for submissions concerning the Bill and held 
public hearings. At the public hearings organisations representing traditional leaders 
supported the Bill.  However, COSATU, the Council of Churches, the Commission 
for Gender Equality and various civil society organisations as well as organisations 
representing rural women and various rural communities opposed it.  
 
The Bill was withdrawn after the hearings, partly because of opposition, but also 
because there was not time to complete the legislative procedures required by section 
76 of the Constitution. Section 76 deals with bills that affect the provinces, including 
bills that impact on customary law and traditional leadership. Such bills require the 
National Council of Provinces to follow a longer and more consultative process than 
legislation that does not affect the provinces.  
  
The 2008 Bill was revived this year with the exact same wording. The Department of 
Justice explained that the Bill replaces the provisions of the Black Administration Act 
of 1927 which deal with the powers of chiefs and headmen to settle disputes and try 
offences. The Black Administration Act was repealed in 2005, but these sections were 
extended pending the introduction of new legislation concerning traditional courts. 
After the Bill was withdrawn in 2008, the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and 
Amendments of Certain Laws Act was amended to extend the repeal date of those 
sections until 30 December 2009.  A further amendment extending the repeal date 
until December 2010 has been tabled but not yet enacted.  This indicates that the 
Department of Justice plans to enact a new law dealing with traditional courts before 
the end of next year.  
  
What happened to the South African Law Commission recommendations?  
Between 1999 and 2003 the South African Law Commission considered customary 
courts and how best to reform the law to support and enhance them. After extensive 
discussions, submissions and workshops in rural areas it submitted a report and a draft 
Bill to the Minister of Justice in 2003. The members of the customary courts project 
committee of the Law Commission included Prof Maithufi, Prof Bennett, Judge 
Mokgoro, Ms Baqwa, Prof Dlamini, Prof Himonga, Prof Mqeke, Ms Mbatha, Mr 
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Mawila, Prof Rugege and Ms Mashao. Some people have criticised the Commission 
for not consulting adequately, but it consulted with a far greater cross section of rural 
people than was done in respect of the current Bill.  
 
Various women’s organisations criticised the Commission’s first discussion document 
for failing to address the problems rural women face in customary courts. In response, 
a series of consultation meetings with rural women were jointly convened by the 
Commission for Gender Equality, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits and 
the National Land Committee. These took place in partnership with land NGOs in the 
different provinces, including AFRA and TRALSO. These consultation meetings 
were used as the basis for a joint submission by the three organisations, which is 
included in this publication. The Commission’s 2003 final report refers to the 
concerns raised in the women’s submission and how it attempted to address these.  
  
The current Bill by contrast, states that it was drafted in collaboration with the 
National House of Traditional Leaders and attaches a list of consultative workshops, 
all of which involved traditional leaders. It appears that no attempt was made to 
consult ordinary rural people or to consult rural women as a specific interest group. 
The inadequacy of the 2008 consultation process was one of the complaints raised 
during the Portfolio Committee public hearings held during May 2008.  
  
In the light of the extensive deliberations undertaken by the Law Commission, it is 
surprising that the current Bill differs substantially from the Law Commission’s 
recommendations and makes no reference to that prior process. In the discussion of 
the 2008 Bill which follows, the provisions which are markedly different from the 
Law Commission’s recommendations will be discussed where relevant.  
  
Links to the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act  
The Law Commission recommendations were submitted in January 2003. In late 2003 
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act was enacted. It provides a 
national framework for provincial laws dealing with traditional leadership. These 
provincial laws have since been enacted in all the provinces. Section 20 of the 
Framework Act provides that national government may provide a role for traditional 
leaders and traditional councils in a respect of a range of issues including land 
administration, agriculture, health, welfare, safety and security, and the administration 
of justice.  
  
This is achieved by the introduction of national bills by the relevant government 
departments. For example the Department of Land Affairs introduced the Communal 
Land Rights Act which provides a role for traditional councils as land administration 
committees and the Department of Justice introduced the Traditional Courts Bill. 
Various provisions of the 2008 Traditional Courts Bill cross refer to the Framework 
Act and will be explained in the context of that Act.  
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SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE 2008 TRADITIONAL COURTS 
BILL  
  
1 Purpose and preamble  
  
The long title of the Bill states the intention to affirm the traditional justice system 
based on restorative justice and reconciliation. Restorative justice is when dispute 
resolution is focused on finding a solution that everyone can live with. The primary 
aim of restorative justice is not to punish offenders but to reach an agreement between 
the parties about a way forward, which may include punishment as one of its 
components. The long title states that the Bill seeks to enhance customary law. The 
guiding principles in clause 3 stresses the need to align the traditional justice system 
with the Constitution and the rights enshrined in it, together with promotion of 
African values based on reconciliation and restorative justice.  
  
The Bill emphasizes the position of traditional leaders in the administration of justice. 
It refers to the Constitution’s appreciation of the status, institution and role of 
traditional leaders and it states that the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act recognises the responsibilities of traditional leaders in legal matters. 
By contrast, the Law Commission report did not highlight the role of traditional 
leaders in its draft bill.  
  
2 Composition of the court, presiding officers and the training of traditional 
leaders  
  
Only traditional leaders and those of royal birth may be presiding officers of 
traditional courts  
Clause 4 of the 2008 Bill provides for the Minister of Justice to appoint traditional 
leaders who are recognised in terms of the Framework Act, as the presiding officers 
of Traditional Courts. The Minister may also, at the written request of a king, queen 
or senior traditional leader (as defined in the Framework Act), appoint a headman or 
headwoman or a member of the royal family as an alternative presiding officer, in the 
absence of the king, queen or senior traditional leader. In effect, this limits the pool of 
people who may become presiding officers to traditional leaders and those of royal 
blood.  
  
The vast majority of traditional leaders are men, and women’s succession to 
traditional leadership positions remains contested by their male relatives and 
organisations representing traditional leadership (as the recent Shilubana case attests). 
Although ultimately the Constitutional Court confirmed Mrs Shilubana’s appointment 
as Hosi of the Valoyi community, her appointment was strongly opposed by her male 
cousin and by Contralesa. Her cousin challenged her appointment at both the High 
Court and Appeal Court levels. He won in both these courts which led to Hosi 
Shilubana’s appeal to the Constitutional Court. Her appointment was ultimately 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court but the judgment does not mean that women 
can automatically succeed to traditional leadership positions. It is limited to those 
situations where the royal family and traditional authority of a community choose to 




Training of presiding officers  
Clause 4(5) of the Bill provides that, after a presiding officer has been appointed, he 
or she should attend a training programme within 12 months. However there is an 
exemption provision in clause 4(5)(a), and non-attendance may be excused where it is 
not due to the fault of the person concerned (clause 4(6)). This creates the potential 
for untrained people to preside over traditional courts.  
  
Centralising power and responsibility to the presiding officer  
The Bill defines a “traditional court” as a court “presided over by a king, queen, 
senior traditional leader, headman, headwoman or a member of a royal family who 
has been designated as a presiding officer of a traditional court by the Minister…and 
which includes a forum of community elders who meet to resolve any disputes that 
have arisen…”  
However this “forum of elders” is not given specific powers and functions, and its 
role and composition are not mentioned again in the Bill. Instead, all power and 
responsibility is vested in the presiding officer alone. Clause 16 of the Bill reinforces 
the Western notion of the “court” being identical to the “presiding officer” in that it 
refers to complaints against traditional courts as being complaints against the 
“presiding officer.” No provision is made for a situation where the court as a whole is 
at fault, or members other than the presiding officer.  
 
The Law Commission recommendations concerning the role of councillors and 
how they should be elected or selected  
By contrast, the Law Commission report describes current practice as follows: “[I]n 
most cases the chief will not normally preside over the proceedings. A trusted 
councillor will be appointed to preside” (p 6). The report goes on to say that 
councillors are members of the community appointed by the chief or headman.  
The report discusses various options in relation to the appointment of councillors for 
the court (p 7). One is that councillors be popularly elected at a general meeting. 
Another is that the chief or headman appoints the councillors from a panel of persons 
elected by the relevant community. The last option is that the chief or headman 
appoints councillors at his discretion.  
  
IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN  
  
The 1999 joint submission by the CGE, CALS and the NLC raised the problem of 
customary courts being either dominated by, or exclusively composed of, male 
councillors, and of women’s inadequate representation before customary courts.  
  
Its report on the provincial consultation meetings stated:  
  
According to our respondents traditional proceedings followed in their communities 
are as follows: When a woman has a complaint that she wants to report to a 
traditional court, she firstly has to report the complaint to one of the male elders in 
her family. The elder will act as her witness and representative and will report the 
case to the councillors at the headmen’s court. During the court proceedings a 
women only talks when talked to or asked questions and is not allowed to give input 
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during the court proceedings. Single women and girls are not allowed to attend a 
court session. In other instances after being asked questions a woman will be told to 
leave. This means women are only allowed in courts when they are complainants. On 
the other hand according to our respondents, men can bring their cases to court 
without a witness, participate during the court proceedings and ask questions.  
  
In the Eastern Cape specifically we were told that traditional courts are situated next 
to a kraal which is said to be a ‘place for men’ and where ancestors are. It is said that 
ancestors relate better with men than with women because women are believed to be 
un-pure and are associated with witchcraft. As a result women are not allowed near 
to the court, which is situated next to the ancestral kraal. We were told that, 
traditionally, if a woman has to attend a court session, she sits very far from the 
councillors who constitute the traditional court. Women are not allowed to speak or 
interrogate men. Even if she is a woman chief she is treated in a similar way and she 
has to appoint a male representative to talk and interrogate people on her behalf. All 
these procedures which are practised under the label of tradition show discrimination 
against women.  
  
Ultimately the Law Commission report discussed the issue of women’s 
representation in customary courts at some length, again referring to three 
alternatives.  
• The first is that the law prescribe a 50% quota for women.  
• The second is that the composition of the court must have regard to 
various constitutional and legal requirements concerning equality for 
women.  
• The last is simply to prescribe that a customary court must include both 
men and women in its composition.  
The report concludes that a policy decision must be taken by government in relation 
to the important question of how councillors should be chosen, and on how to ensure 
meaningful representation of women in customary courts (p 9).  
  
The current Bill does not address the important issues raised by the Law Commission 
concerning the election of councillors, and the need to include women councillors. It 
is not clear whether the drafters anticipated that traditional councils established in 
terms of the TLGFA would act as the “forum of elders” referred to in the definition of 
traditional courts. The TLGFA provides that 40% of the members of a traditional 
council should be elected, and that 30% should be women. The women’s quota need 
not be elected, it may be appointed by the “senior traditional leader.” Moreover it may 
be decreased by the Premier if an “insufficient number of women are available.”1  
  
In the absence of the Bill providing a role for traditional councils in traditional courts, 
it cannot be assumed that existing traditional councils will constitute the “forum of 
elders.” In any event, the Bill provides no role or statutory authority for the “forum of 
elders.”  
Instead all authority is vested in the presiding officer and clause 4 of the Bill has the 
effect of limiting the pool for presiding officers to those of royal blood. The Bill thus 
                                               
1 Section 3(2)(d) of TLGFA. 
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fails to recognise the potential contribution of respected councillors, male or female, 
who emerge organically from within communities at its lower hierarchical levels (e.g. 
family, clan and village) and have a proven track record of resolving disputes in a 
customary setting.  
The hierarchical structure imposed by the Bill (emphasising the role of the chief as the 
“presiding officer”) is different from actual and emerging practice in many areas. The 
Bill centralises power in the hands of individual traditional leaders and bolsters their 
ability to interpret and define customary law. This undermines the development of a 
“living” customary law that reflects all the different voices currently involved in 
dispute resolution and in debates about the content and interpretation of changing 
customs and practices.2 Vesting sole authority in the chief as presiding officer ignores 
and undermines the input of other community members – including women - in the 
development of “living” customary law.  
The Black Administration Act of 1927 set the precedent for centralising statutory 
authority for dispute resolution in individual chiefs and headmen. Section 12 of the 
1927 Act authorises officially appointed chiefs and headmen to hear and determine 
civil disputes and to try certain offences and, like the 2008 Bill provides no 
recognition for the customary role played by councillors in resolving disputes.  
  
The provisions relating to women in the 2008 Bill  
While it does not address issues pertaining to the composition and role of councillors 
in traditional courts, the 2008 Bill does contain provisions concerning women and 
traditional courts. Clause 9(2) provides that the presiding officer must ensure that the 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights are observed and respected, and in particular 
“that women are afforded full and equal participation in the proceedings, as men are.”  
Because the Bill as a whole does not provide a role for councillors in the proceedings 
of the court, the implication is that this clause refers to women’s participation as 
litigants and accused people before the court, and not as members of the court itself. 
Furthermore instead of the Bill prescribing specific protections for women to address 
the specific problems they face, it puts the onus on the presiding officer to ensure that 
women are fairly treated. The pace of change is put in the hands of the presiding 
officer, rather than in the hands of women themselves. A woman who decides to take 
up unequal treatment in a traditional court would have to focus her challenge on the 
failure of the presiding officer, rather than the enforcement of a clear legal provision. 
This is a heavy burden to place on women given the unequal power dynamics in rural 
areas, and the isolation and poverty of many rural women.  
One of the specific problems facing women in many traditional courts is that they are 
not allowed to speak or represent themselves, but have to rely on male relatives to 
represent them. This puts women at a serious disadvantage, particularly in cases 
arising from disputes with their male relatives, or where they have no adult male 
relatives available to represent them.  
Clause 9(3)(a) bars lawyers from traditional courts. Clause 9(3)(b) provides that a 
party may be represented by “his or her wife or husband, family member, neighbour 
or member of the community, in accordance with customary law and custom.”  
                                               
2 See also Alexkor Limited and Another v The Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 
(CC) at para 52: “It is important to note that indigenous law is not a fixed body of formally classified 
and easily ascertainable rules. By its very nature it evolves as the people who live by its norms change 
their patterns of life.” 
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Instead of providing explicitly that women should be allowed to represent themselves 
if they so choose, it enables the continuation of the practice of male relatives 
representing women “in accordance with customary law and custom.” This is justified 
on the basis that men too may be represented by their wives, a far fetched possibility 
which attempts to cloak the continuation of inequality in even-handedness.  
  
3 The geographical boundaries (area) of the courts’ jurisdiction and the debate 
about whether people should be allowed to “opt out” of traditional courts  
  
Clause 4 of the 2008 Bill provides that only traditional leaders who are recognised in 
terms of the Framework Act (TLGFA) can be designated at presiding officers of 
traditional courts. The court’s area of jurisdiction is the same as that of the traditional 
leader’s area of jurisdiction, which is also determined by the TLGFA. Section 28 of 
the TLGFA provides that those traditional leaders who were officially recognised 
before the Act came into effect in 2003 remain in office as “recognised traditional 
leaders.” It deems pre-existing “tribes” to be “traditional communities”, and pre-
existing tribal authorities (created and delineated in terms of the Bantu Authorities 
Act of 1951) to be “traditional councils.”3 
  
This entrenches the controversial tribal boundaries established during apartheid as the 
jurisdictional areas of traditional courts. Tribal authorities were created virtually wall-
to-wall in the former homelands. Some of them cover large areas and include 
groupings of people who have, or claim, independent identities or land rights and 
dispute the boundaries and authority of the tribal authority.  
  
The Bill makes it an offence for a person to refuse to appear before a traditional court, 
or to leave the court without the permission of the presiding officer (s 20). An order 
made by a traditional court has the effect of a civil judgment of the magistrate’s court 
having jurisdiction and is enforceable in terms of the provisions of the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act (clause 11 (2) (d))  
  
Discussion  
A number of issues arise concerning the court’s jurisdictional area.  
  
These include:  
• The consequences of ignoring and undermining “lower level” dispute 
resolution forums that may exist within a court’s official jurisdictional area.  
• The consequences of entrenching traditional leaders’ authority within 
contested tribal boundaries.  
• Issues arising from the fact that more than one system of customary law may 
apply within a court’s boundaries.  
• Issues concerning choice and people’s right to “opt out” of official traditional 
courts and use other courts or dispute resolution forums instead.  
  
Centralising power undermines lower level dispute resolution forums  
                                               
3 Traditional councils must comply with the composition requirements set out in s 3 of the TLGFA.  
These require that 40% of the members of a traditional council must be elected, and 30% must be 
women. 
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The Law Commission report describes that in many communities claims or 
complaints start at the level of the family council, and are referred “upwards” only if 
they are not resolved at the lower level, going for example from family level to village 
level (headman’s council), and from there to the level of the chief’s council (p 5). The 
report recommends that headmen’s courts be recognised as a specific level of court 
and be given the same authority as chiefs’ courts.  
  
However the 2008 Bill does not refer to, or recognise, courts at village level, or courts 
convened by headmen. The only role the Bill provides for headmen is dependant on 
whether a “senior traditional leader” delegates his authority as presiding officer of a 
traditional court to a headman. This is in contrast to the 1927 Black Administration 
Act which enables headmen to hear disputes and try offences on the same basis as 
chiefs, albeit only headmen who are officially recognised.  
  
There are also other types of dispute resolution forums which rural people use, such 
as those run by civics, development committees and councillors. None of these kinds 
of forums are recognised by the current Bill. Instead the senior traditional leader of 
the “tribal authority” area is given sole statutory responsibility for dispute resolution 
and people living within his boundaries have no option but to appear in his court if 
summoned to do so. Yet the existence of alternative forums contributes to 
accountability because people avoid forums they consider to be unfair or biased.  
  
Entrenching traditional leaders’ authority within contested tribal boundaries  
The problem is compounded where groups of people with other identities and land 
rights are included within contested tribal authority boundaries. These boundaries 
derive from the controversial 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. In many instances 
traditional leaders who co-operated with the Bantustan agenda were “rewarded” with 
larger areas and higher status, while those who resisted it were demoted and placed 
within the boundaries of collaborators.  
  
Apart from the issue of disputed tribal boundaries a wide variety of different types of 
African settlement were put within one or other tribal authority boundary during the 
process of Bantustan consolidation. Thus ethnically mixed groups of people with 
diverse histories including labour tenancy, mission settlement, land purchase, removal 
from “black spots”, farm evictions or quitrent ownership find themselves within tribal 
authority boundaries they have no historical connection with.  
  
Apartheid land policies which dumped black people in the former homelands and 
restricted movement out of these areas created forced overlapping of land rights on a 
massive scale. The creation of ethnically separate Bantustans heightened tensions 
between people with different histories and over-lapping rights to the same land. In 
that context the powers proposed for “officially recognised” traditional leaders are 
controversial. The current Bill provides traditional leaders with the power to summon 
fine and punish all those who live within their “tribal” boundaries regardless of the 
history of the area and contestation about boundaries and ethnic identity.  
  
More than one system of customary law within a court’s jurisdictional 
boundaries  
Where land rights and identities overlap the different groups living within a court’s 
jurisdictional boundaries may use different systems of customary law. Clause 9(4) 
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provides that where two or more systems of customary law are applicable in a dispute, 
the court must apply the system of customary law the parties agree on. It provides that 
where there is no agreement between the parties the system of customary law 
applicable in the area of jurisdiction of the traditional court takes precedence, or the 
court may apply the system of customary law with which the parties have their closest 
connection.  
  
It is left to the court (in the person of the presiding officer) to ascertain this. Yet it is 
precisely issues of identity, origins and customary law that are in dispute between 
groups with overlapping land rights. In such disputes there is unlikely to be agreement 
about which system of customary law applies, and even about which is prevalent in 
the area. The Bill enables a presiding officer to assert jurisdiction over people who 
subscribe to a different system of customary law, and people who have no connection 
with customary law.  
  
Clause 8 provides that sessions of the traditional court will be held at the time and 
place determined by the presiding officer, in accordance with customary law and 
customary practices. Again, this ignores the reality that disputed versions and 
interpretations of customary law may exist within the court’s jurisdictional area, and 
gives the presiding officer the authority to unilaterally determine the content of 
custom.  
  
“Opting-out” and choice of courts  
The issue of whether people have the right to “opt out” of traditional courts was 
debated by the Law Commission. Ultimately the Law Commission recommended (p 
32) that people must be allowed to “opt out” of appearing before customary courts 
because of the “controversy surrounding the issue of the independence and 
impartiality of customary courts.” It concluded that it was “safer to leave the door 
open for objecting to the jurisdiction of the customary court and opting out in favour 
of a magistrate’s court or other court, particularly in criminal proceedings.” This was 
despite the report noting “strong opposition” by traditional leaders to the idea of 
opting out.  
  
The fact that the 2008 Bill (in conjunction with the Framework Act) entrenches the 
old tribal authority boundaries as the default boundaries for traditional courts worsens 
the underlying problem. Fixed territorial boundaries thereby replace consensual 
affiliation (support and free choice) as the basis for determining the boundaries of the 
courts’ jurisdiction. The Commission’s 2003 draft bill had entailed a more open-
ended and flexible approach in terms of boundaries. It provided that customary courts 
should operate at “such different levels as are recognised in customary law.” (see 
Clause 3(1) of the 2003 draft bill) The Women’s Legal Centre, in its submission to the 
portfolio committee, said that the imposition of fixed territorial boundaries has far 
reaching implications for the nature of traditional courts, and is inconsistent with the 
consensual character of customary law.  
  
4 What issues can the court decide? Civil and criminal jurisdiction. Excluding 
specific matters from the courts jurisdiction. Excluding lawyers.  
  
A civil dispute is a “private” dispute between two people, or parties, for example a 
claim for damages arising from the fault of one of the parties. Civil disputes are not 
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prosecuted by the police, they are taken forward by the parties against one another. A 
criminal offence, on the other hand, is a crime against society (for example theft or 
murder) which is governed by criminal law. In criminal matters complainants report 
the crime to the authorities (generally the police), who then prosecute the offender.  
  
Clause 5 of the Bill provides that a traditional court may hear and determine civil 
disputes arising out of customary law and custom. However clause 5(2) excludes a 
range of issues from the civil jurisdiction of traditional courts. The list of exclusions 
includes any constitutional matter, divorce and separation, the custody and 
guardianship of children, wills, and claims above an amount or value determined by 
the Minister from time to time and published in the Government Gazette.  
  
Clause 6 provides that a traditional court may also hear and determine certain 
criminal offences which are listed in a schedule. The criminal offences listed in the 
schedule include theft and stock theft up to a value to be determined, malicious injury 
to property, again up to a value to be determined, assault (where grievous bodily harm 
has not been inflicted) and crimen injuria up to a certain amount. Crimen injuria is 
damaging another person’s dignity or reputation.  
  
Criminal jurisdiction and excluding lawyers  
Section 35(3) of the Constitution confers on every accused person a right to a fair trial 
which must be a public trial before an ordinary court (s 35(3)(c)) and includes the 
right to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner (s 35(3) (f)).  
On the other hand, clause 9(3)(a) of the 2008 Bill provides that: “No party to any 
proceedings before a traditional court may be represented by a legal representative.”  
  
This led to submissions to the Justice Portfolio Committee arguing that the 2008 Bill 
is unconstitutional because it removes the right to legal representation in criminal 
matters, and creates a parallel system of criminal justice outside the ordinary courts.  
  
The Law Commission’s report in 2003 discussed the arguments for excluding lawyers 
from customary courts, for example that they are unnecessary and expensive in simple 
matters and introduce inequality between those who can afford to pay for lawyers and 
those who can’t. They pointed to the danger of lawyers complicating cases by taking 
up complex technical points and so undermining the straightforward solution-
orientated nature of customary courts.  
  
However the Law Commission concluded that to debar lawyers in criminal matters 
raises difficulties in relation to section 35 of the Constitution. Ultimately the 
Commission concluded that “since customary law does not distinguish among 
spokespersons as to whether they are legally qualified or not, it is theoretically 
possible for a person with legal qualifications to appear in the customary court as a 
spokesperson for one of the parties. However, he or she would have to conduct 
himself or herself in a manner suited to the lay nature of the court.” (p 24)  
  
In the end, unlike the current Bill, the Commission did not recommend the explicit 
exclusion of lawyers from traditional courts.  
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Debates about excluding specific matters from the jurisdiction of traditional 
courts  
  
The argument against exclusions  
Some people argue that since the Constitution recognises customary law, it must also 
recognise customary dispute resolution forums and processes on their own terms. 
Supporters of this view argue that prior to colonialism customary courts dealt with all 
disputes, including those later classified as civil and criminal in terms of “western” 
law. On this basis they oppose excluding specific matters from the jurisdiction of 
customary courts.  
  
Others point out that people living in isolated rural areas may not have effective 
access to other courts and that, in practice, many customary courts routinely deal with 
civil and criminal matters that are beyond their formal jurisdiction.  
  
The argument for exclusions – the impact on women  
Others point to inherent and constitutional problems with customary courts being 
given jurisdiction over matters that should be dealt with through the formal courts and 
in terms of the Constitution. Women’s groups in particular have argued that 
customary courts should not be able to hear and determine a range of matters affecting 
women because their composition and patriarchal character favours male interests and 
renders women particularly vulnerable.  
  
For example the 1999 CGE/CALS/NLC submission to the Law Commission 
recommended excluding all matters relating to the status of women from the 
jurisdiction of traditional courts.  
  
They specifically recommended that the following matters be excluded:  
• Violence against women and children, including rape, attempted rape, 
indecent assault, domestic violence and child abuse;  
• Cases of guardianship and maintenance, including determination of paternity; 
and  
• Marriage, both civil and customary.  
  
They raised serious concerns about disputes concerning land rights in the context of 
women’s vulnerability to eviction and the overlapping “executive” role of traditional 
leaders in administering and allocating land on the one hand, and deciding disputes 
about land rights on the other.  
  
Ultimately the Law Commission report and draft bill of 2003 (schedule 1 on p 13 of 
the 2003 draft bill) recommended a much longer list of exclusions than those 
contained in the current Bill.  
  
5 The powers of a traditional court to impose and enforce sanctions. Offences 
and penalties  
  
Clause 10(1) limits the sanctions that a traditional court can impose in criminal cases. 
In terms of this clause a traditional court may not impose cruel or degrading 
punishment. Nor may it detain or imprison people, nor banish them, nor use corporal 
punishment, nor impose a fine above an amount determined by the Minister from time 
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to time and published in the Government Gazette. These exclusions do not, however, 
apply in respect of sanctions for civil disputes.  
  
Clause 10(2) gives a traditional court far reaching powers to order and impose a range 
of orders and sanctions. These include:  
• the payment of fines (the maximum amount to be set by the Minister from 
time to time)  
• the payment of settlement awards between parties, including damages and 
compensation, whether in money or livestock  
• an order that a person stop specific conduct  
• an apology  
• progress reports to the court about compliance with an order  
• referring a matter to the NPA  
• an order that one of the parties to the dispute, both parties, or any other 
person perform unpaid labour for the community under the supervision of 
the traditional court  
• an order that one of the parties to the dispute, both parties, or any other 
person perform some form of service or benefit to a specified victim.  
• an order depriving the accused person or defendant of any benefits that 
accrue in terms of customary law or custom  
• a caution or reprimand in the case of a criminal dispute  
• a combination of the above sanctions  
• any other order that the traditional court may deem appropriate “which is 
consistent with the provisions of this Act”  
  
Clause 11 gives the court powers to enforce the above sanctions. For example, in 
cases of failure to comply with the above sanctions, the court may “deal with the 
matter in accordance with customary law and custom” and may impose further 
sanctions. Furthermore orders made by a traditional court are enforceable by 




Forced labour  
Certain of these sanctions are controversial because of the nature of the far reaching 
powers given to traditional leaders acting as presiding officers. For example the 
power to order people to perform free services, including free labour, for the 
“community.” The Bill gives traditional leaders acting as presiding officers the power 
to order any person to perform free services. The person need not even be a party to a 
dispute before the court. This provision enables the court to order people to perform 
forced labour and is controversial in the context of contestation about the “customary” 
practice of women being required to work in the chief’s fields.  
  
In situations where there are different communities, or disputed community 
boundaries within the court’s jurisdictional area the Bill enables the officially 
recognised traditional leader to order people who dispute his authority to perform free 
labour. It authorises him to deal with defaulters according to “customary law.” This 
begs the question of which customary law, and which “community.” The Bill gives 
the officially recognised traditional leader sole authority to define the content of 
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customary law, including in contexts where the content and version of customary law 
is disputed.  
  
Of perhaps even greater concern is clause 10(2)(i). This authorises the court to 
deprive an accused person or defendant of benefits that accrue in terms of customary 
law or custom. Customary entitlements to land are one such benefit, community 
membership is another. Effectively the court is authorised to revoke a person’s 
customary rights to land, and even strip a person of their community membership. 
Clause 10(1) limits the court’s right to impose banishment in criminal matters. But 
there is no such limitation in respect of civil disputes.  
  
The powers given to the court in this regard override inbuilt customary protections 
which require that serious matters such the cancellation of land rights be debated 
within the community at various levels, and ultimately require the endorsement of a 
pitso, or a general meeting of the entire community. The structure of the current Bill 
does not recognise these levels of debate and decision making and instead vests legal 
authority exclusively in the senior traditional leader in his role as presiding officer. To 
this extent the Bill is at odds with customary principles and undermines important 
checks and balances built into customary dispute resolution processes.  
  
Several of the open ended sanctions contained in clause 10 and 11 create the potential 
for abuse of power. This is particularly problematic given the vulnerability and 
isolation of many rural communities, and the difficulties they would face in 
challenging abuse of power. Clause 13 of the Bill provides that people may appeal to 
the magistrate’s court against a decision of a traditional court. However the basis for 
appeals is circumscribed by clause 14. Appeals are allowed only on the basis that the 
traditional court acted outside the scope of the Act: that it had no jurisdiction; that the 
court was biased or malicious; or the procedure followed “grossly irregular.” 
“Irregular” is not enough. The person lodging the dispute has to prove “gross” 
irregularity.  
  
The Johannesburg Bar (Advocates) submission to the Justice Portfolio Committee 
argued that limiting the basis for appeals in this way is in conflict with the 
Constitution  
  
6 Does the Current Bill comply with the Constitution? Clause 7 of the Bill.  
  
Clause 7 – “Distinct from courts referred to in section 166 of the Constitution”  
Clause 7 of the 2008 Bill states that traditional courts are distinct from the courts 
referred to in section 166 of the Constitution and operate in accordance with the 
principles of customary law which seeks to promote restorative justice and 
reconciliation.  
  
Section 166 of the Constitution refers to the different courts in South Africa, being the 
Constitutional Court, the Appeal Court, the High Courts, the Magistrate’s Courts and 
any other court established by law which has a similar status to High Courts or 
Magistrate’s Courts.  
  
Discussion of the implications of clause 7  
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The drafters could arguably have established customary courts on a par with 
magistrate’s courts in terms of this clause, but chose not to do so. This is probably 
because some of the Bill’s provisions do not comply with some of the constitutional 
requirements governing courts set out in the constitution. For example section 35(3)(f) 
of the Constitution provides that every accused person is entitled to be represented by 
a legal practitioner in criminal matters. Yet the traditional courts Bill excludes legal 
representation in clause 9(3)(a).  
  
The separation of powers doctrine is a constitutional principle. It prohibits judicial 
officers from exercising law making and executive powers. Yet traditional leaders 
claim to have administrative (executive), legislative and judicial powers within 
customary law. One of the purposes of clause 7 may be an attempt to protect 
traditional leaders as presiding officers from the separation of powers doctrine. Some 
lawyers say it cannot do so, and that the Act is unconstitutional for this reason.  
  
Clause 7 also raises questions about whether traditional courts should be named 
“courts” in terms of the ordinary meaning of the word “court.” Section 34 of the 
Constitution differentiates between a court and an “independent and impartial tribunal 
or forum” and provides that disputes may be resolved in such tribunals or forums in 
addition to courts. Some people therefore argue that the term “customary tribunal” is 
more appropriate than “traditional court” because it clarifies that customary tribunals 
are different from other courts and therefore cannot be expected to comply with all the 
provisions in the Constitution applicable to “ordinary” courts.  
  
Since customary law is recognised by the Constitution, and is different from other 
law, many people argue that the forums which apply it must be able to be different 
from “ordinary” courts so that they can operate in accordance with the underlying 
principles of customary law, in particular the principles of reconciliation and 
restorative justice.  
  
Of key importance here are questions concerning the underlying nature of customary 
law, and the issue of choice and “opting out.” If people are not allowed to “opt out” of 
the jurisdiction of a particular traditional court, in favour of either another court or 
another customary tribunal, the consensual basis of customary law is undermined. 
This difficulty would not arise if the statutory jurisdiction of the traditional courts 
were to be based on the consent of the parties, and not on tribal authority boundaries, 




Questions for discussion  
  
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of existing customary courts?  
  
2. What are their advantages and disadvantages for women?  
  
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of magistrate’s courts?  
  
4. What are their advantages and disadvantages for women?  
  
5. What steps need to be taken to improve access to justice in rural areas?  
  
6. What steps need to be taken to improve access to justice for women in rural 
areas?  
  
The Current Bill  
  
1. What are the advantages of the Current Bill?  
  
2. What are its disadvantages?  
  
3. How could the current Bill be improved?  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
